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Owner methods

The contract has a small set of owner-only methods for adding markets and managing collateral tokens. Everything else, including the grace period and the oracle guards, was fixed when the contract was initialized.

The owner is owner_id in get_config, which is setllend.near itself. Owner methods are plain function calls signed by that account. Any other caller gets Owner only.

warning

A risk-parameter update applies at once, to open loans too. Lowering a token's liquidation threshold can make existing loans liquidatable in the same block, with no notice period. Setllend's keeper picks such loans up on its next scan. Borrowers should keep a margin above the liquidation threshold.

What the owner can and cannot do​

The owner canThe owner cannot
Add a new maturityRemove or change a maturity
Add a collateral token with its risk parametersRemove a collateral token
Change a token's max_ltv, liq_threshold, and liq_bonusChange a token's decimals or feed_id once added
Freeze and unfreeze a tokenChange the debt token, the oracle, the grace period, or the oracle guards
Pause the contract (there is no pause)
Move user escrow, collateral, or notes through any contract method

setllend.near also holds a full-access key, and with it the account holder can deploy new code to the account. The contract itself has no upgrade method and no timelock. To check what code is running, compare its hash with a reproducible build of the published source; see Verify the contract and Trust model.

add_maturity​

pub fn add_maturity(&mut self, maturity: U64)
{"maturity": "1795766400000000000"}

Adds a maturity (nanoseconds) with an empty book and an empty note pool. It must be in the future and not listed yet. Adding a maturity can't touch existing loans. Maturities are never removed. Once a maturity passes, it accepts no new orders and no fills, but repay, add_collateral (until maturity + grace), liquidate, redeem, cancel, and withdrawals keep working.

Event: maturity_added. Errors: Owner only, Maturity must be in the future, Maturity exists.

The maturities on mainnet:

Maturity (UTC)Timestamp
2026-11-08 08:001794124800000000000
2026-11-13 08:001794556800000000000
2026-11-27 08:001795766400000000000
2026-12-25 08:001798185600000000000

add_collateral_token​

pub fn add_collateral_token(
&mut self,
token_id: String, // Intents asset ID
decimals: u8,
feed_id: String, // oracle feed of the token's USD price
max_ltv: u32, // bps
liq_threshold: u32, // bps
liq_bonus: u32, // bps
)
{"token_id":"nep141:wrap.near","decimals":24,"feed_id":"c415de8d2eba7db216527dff4b60e8f3a5311c740dadb233e13e12547e226750","max_ltv":7000,"liq_threshold":8000,"liq_bonus":500}

Adds a token to the end of the collateral list, not frozen. Checks:

  • token_id is not the debt token and not listed yet.
  • feed_id is not empty.
  • 0 < max_ltv < liq_threshold.
  • liq_threshold × (1 + liq_bonus) < 100%, so a liquidation at the threshold can still pay the bonus out of the collateral. With 80% and 5%: 0.80 × 1.05 = 0.84, which passes.

These check the owner's own parameters; they are not limits on users. decimals and feed_id are fixed once added, because the amounts and prices of open loans depend on them.

Event: collateral_token_added. Errors: Owner only, Debt token cannot be collateral, Collateral token exists, Feed ID is empty, Require 0 < max_ltv < liq_threshold, Require liq_threshold * (1 + liq_bonus) < 100%.

The tokens on mainnet, all at 70% max LTV, 80% liquidation threshold, and 5% liquidation bonus:

TokenAsset IDDecimalsPrice feed
ETH (from Arbitrum)nep141:arb.omft.near18ETH/USD
ETH (from Base)nep141:base.omft.near18ETH/USD
NEARnep141:wrap.near24NEAR/USD

The values follow Rhea Lend's effective borrow limit for the same assets against USDC (75% × 95% ≈ 71%): max LTV just below it, a threshold 10 points higher because rates are fixed until maturity and prices can be up to 60 seconds old, and a common 5% bonus. See Risk parameters.

update_collateral_token​

pub fn update_collateral_token(&mut self, token_id: String, max_ltv: u32, liq_threshold: u32, liq_bonus: u32)
{"token_id":"nep141:wrap.near","max_ltv":6500,"liq_threshold":7500,"liq_bonus":750}

Replaces the three risk parameters of a listed token, with the same checks as on add. It applies immediately to every open loan and order:

  • A lower liq_threshold lowers the health factor of every loan holding the token, possibly below 1.
  • A lower max_ltv reduces how much can be borrowed or withdrawn against the token from the next fill or withdrawal on.
  • A new liq_bonus changes how much collateral the next liquidation seizes.

Event: collateral_token_updated. Errors: Owner only, Unknown collateral token, and the two parameter checks above.

freeze_collateral_token and unfreeze_collateral_token​

pub fn freeze_collateral_token(&mut self, token_id: String)
pub fn unfreeze_collateral_token(&mut self, token_id: String)
{"token_id":"nep141:wrap.near"}

A frozen token:

  • can't be escrowed in a new borrow or added with add_collateral (Collateral token is frozen);
  • gives no borrowing power: the max LTV check for borrow fills and for collateral withdrawals with debt leaves it out;
  • still counts toward the health factor, so freezing never makes a loan liquidatable by itself;
  • stays in open loans, which run on until repaid, withdrawn, or liquidated.

A loan backed only by a frozen token can't borrow more or withdraw any collateral while it has debt, until it repays or adds another token. Orders that escrowed the token before the freeze can still fill, but the token adds nothing to the max LTV check. This is how Aave v3.1 freezes a reserve.

Unfreezing restores the token completely.

Events: collateral_token_frozen, collateral_token_unfrozen. Errors: Owner only, Unknown collateral token, Already frozen, Not frozen.

Fixed at initialization​

new(config) is #[private], so only setllend.near itself could call it, and it ran in the same transaction as the code deploy (transaction). That transaction also added the four maturities and the three collateral tokens above. The Config it set can't be changed by any method:

FieldValue on mainnetMeaning
owner_idsetllend.nearCaller of the owner methods
intents_contractintents.nearThe only trusted caller, and the target of payouts
oracle_contractaggregate-oracle.nearPrice source
debt_tokennep141:17208628f84f5d6ad33f0da3bbbeb27ffcb398eac501a31bd6ad2011e36133a1USDC, native on NEAR
debt_feed_ideaa020c61cc479712813461ce153894a96a6c00b21ed0cfc2798d1f9a9e9c94aUSDC/USD feed
grace"3600000000000" (1 hour)Time after maturity before unpaid debt becomes liquidatable
oracle_max_age60 secondsLargest distance between a price's publish time and the block time
oracle_max_conf100 bps (1%)Largest accepted conf / price

Also fixed in code: the close factor (100%), simple interest on a 365-day year, and the rounding rules in Math.